Most definitely not, says this fellow
This study illuminates this question in three main sections. In the
first, I underscore the core premise of the Strategic Model that terrorism is an effective instrument of coercion. In this section, I explain why proponents of the Strategic Model believe this premise to be true based on their understanding of bargaining theory, which highlights the strategic utility of escalation under anarchy. In the second section, I present the countervailing empirical evidence. Across disciplines and methodologies, I reveal how studies are consistently finding that terrorism does not actually promote government concessions. In fact, the evidence shows that rather than complying with the demands, target countries tend to dig in their political heels, especially as the level of terrorist violence rises. In the third section, I explore some research and policy implications given the mounting body of evidence that terrorism is counterproductive for coercing government accommodation. Together, the analysis will reveal that the Strategic Model is stronger theoretically than empirically, inviting additional research on the motives of terrorists and the optimal way to combat them.